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 I.  Introduction 
Private schools, though far less numerous than state schools, play a prominent role in 
Britain’s economy and society: relative to state schools they educate a significantly 
disproportionate number of those who find economic, political and social success in 
later life (Sutton Trust, 2005a, 2005b, 2006; Boyd, 1973; Reid, 1986). In this paper 
we investigate the changing association between attendance at a private school and 
subsequent economic success – as measured by pay – covering people who were at 
school during and beyond an era of educational transformation. The current older 
generation of workers were educated in the 1960s and 1970s when most state 
secondary schools were becoming comprehensive and when the private schools were 
in the first phases of a radical modernisation. While this “revolution” in the private 
schools had important social and cultural aspects reflecting broader societal changes, 
central to their new character (it has been maintained) was a rising investment in 
academic success (Rae, 1981: 154-162). This investment was consolidated after 1980 
as fees more than doubled in the next quarter century, and as teacher-pupil ratios and 
educational facilities continued to improve (Green et al., 2007). Thus, younger 
generations of workers experienced a transformed private schools sector with a 
greater emphasis on, and ability to deliver, academic qualifications. 
An understanding of the changing links between private schools and economic 
success is important for the issue of social and economic mobility (Power et al., 
2003). The predominant position of private school graduands can be seen alongside 
evidence of persistent class separation in Britain (Goldthorpe and McKnight, 2004) 
and, if anything, decreased social mobility across the generations (Blanden et al, 
2004), accompanying the general educational expansion of the last quarter century. 
Argument over whether private education restricts mobility and inculcates privilege, 
or whether it merely reflects the existing inequality, dates back at least to the early 
19th century (Rae, 1981: 23). Since school fees ration access according to family 
wealth, the larger the economic returns to private education the more the argument 
that private schools strengthen privilege is underpinned, since the returns act to 
reinforce across generations the already existent inequalities. At the heart of this lies 
also the normative question as to whether it is deemed fair that richer parents are able 
to buy better education for their children, though we shall not be addressing ethical 
issues in this paper. 
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Social concern with high returns might be lessened, though not eliminated, if the 
returns are delivered mainly through the channel of superior academic qualifications: 
in that case the superior academic qualifications and associated skills might be argued 
to convey some societal as well as private benefits (Moretti, 2004a and 2004b). Social 
concern would be reinforced, however, by the prospect of social inefficiency if the 
private school premium were derived in part from monopolistic access to 
occupational or business networks for which the schools are the gate keepers – the 
‘old boys’ network’.  
If, on the other hand, it were found that the outlay on private education gives a small 
or even zero return, the picture would be that rich people are spending their money to 
enjoy certain consumption benefits but not to buy privilege. In that case, while fee-
paying families would no doubt be concerned that their money was ill-spent, there 
would be little or no cause for general social concern over private schools’ effects on 
mobility. 
The common perception is that pupils from private schools do indeed receive a 
substantial wage premium later in life because of their school. Some supportive 
evidence is found from the few formal econometric studies that have addressed the 
issue (Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Dearden et al., 2002; Naylor et al., 2002), but these 
do not systematically address the channels through which private schooling affect 
wages (whether through better qualifications or other means), or how these channels 
and the return itself changed through time as the schools themselves changed. 
Considering the prominence of the status of private schools in debates over education, 
and of the related issues of taxation and charitable status1, there is remarkably little 
empirical evidence underpinning to the public discourse.2 
In this paper we address these issues deploying three large-scale representative survey 
data sets. We use the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS), the National Child 
Development Study (NCDS) and the British Cohort Study to produce comparable 
estimations over time of the premium for private schooling. Using a range of 
techniques we find evidence that the returns increased over time, especially for 
females. With older cohorts, those educated mainly in the 1950s through the 1970s, 
                                                        
1 ISC (2003); Millar (2004). 
2 There is an honourable long tradition of sociological concern with the internal processes and social 
context of public schools, e.g. Wakeford (1969). 
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there was no significant pay premium on average, but there was a significant pay 
premium for males in the upper parts of the residual pay distribution. Moreover, there 
was only partial evidence that this return could be consistent with an ‘old boys’ 
network’. On average there were no significant pay premia for females in these older 
cohorts. In younger cohorts, however, both males and females received a significant 
pay premium after going to private school. The evidence also implies that Rae (1981) 
was right to emphasise academic values in his insider account of the transformation of 
the public schools.3 The superior academic qualifications attained due to attending 
private schools became increasingly evident, and in more recent cohorts explain most 
of the high returns to private education.  
Through the paper, the term “return to private schooling” is used interchangeably with 
the term “private school wage premium”, both defined as the percentage elevation of 
wages associated with having attended a private school. However, the return needs to 
be understood as a gross return as the estimates in the main part of the paper take no 
direct account of the investment outlay. The paper concludes with a rough calculation 
of the net returns to private school investment, implied by our individual estimates 
and information about average school fees. This calculation suggests that, on average, 
the parents (sometimes grandparents) of those being educated in private schools 
during the 1980s made a wise investment.  
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II we review the changes that have taken 
place in the private sector over the last 30 years. Section III briefly describes the three 
datasets used in this study and the methods used to derive variables. Section IV 
presents empirical results and interprets the findings. The last section concludes and 
discusses further research.  
 
II The Changing Environment for Private Education in Britain. 
Private schools in Britain have a long history dating back at least to 597 AD. In any 
modern economy with a fully-fledged education system, however, private schools 
have to contend with the threat that the state will crowd out private investments in 
                                                        
3 “Public school” is the older yet confusing term for most fee-paying secondary schools in Britain, 
though not in Northern Ireland. The phrase came about with the Public Schools Acts of the 19th century 
which regulated these schools, although more recently the sector has discouraged its use because of its 
old fashioned connotations. 
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time-honoured fashion. Private schools have, therefore, to offer their clients 
something in addition. Top of the list for most schools come better teaching resources, 
and supportive peer effects through selective admissions procedures. Private schools 
may also cater for pupils with specialised needs or with religious preferences, the 
latter being a common hallmark of private schooling in very many countries. 
Outcomes of the investment can be academic (better qualifications, access to better 
universities) or non-academic (the ‘rounded individual’, the ‘confident leader’, better 
‘soft skills’). Either the improved qualifications, or the non-academic outcomes or 
both would then deliver economic returns to the investment as gauged by better pay or 
access to higher-ranking jobs (perhaps via higher-ranking university education). 
Schools might also be thought to provide access to ‘old boys’ networks’ or ‘old girls’ 
networks’. To compete with state education, schools can also deliver consumption 
services superior to those available in government schools or elsewhere: sports 
facilities and tuition, music and other cultural goods, which are tied with the academic 
education package.  
This range of strategies affords room for a variety of private schools, with mixed 
offerings and pricing structures. Thus private schools in Britain are quite 
heterogeneous. They include the traditional ‘public schools’, the ex-direct grant 
schools, other private secondary schools, the prep schools, and a small number of pre-
prep and specialist schools. Most are for boarding, either exclusively or as a choice; 
almost all used to be single-sex, though many are now co-educational. Schools vary 
also in their mix of emphasis on academic and non-academic outcomes; and there is 
additional variation by religious affiliation. Nevertheless, what all private schools 
share is the facility to offer something different from state-maintained schools in 
return for a fee. To represent their common interests, most private schools belong to 
one or more of 10 associations, which in turn are members or affiliates of the 
Independent Schools Council (ISC). We return, in Section 4.3, to consider how 
heterogeneity impinges on estimates of the returns to private schooling.  
Among the available strategies, the emphases have changed over recent decades. In 
Rae’s perspicacious insider account of the public schools in the 1960s and 1970s he 
describes how the schools were obliged to adapt to a new and uncertain environment, 
characterised by changes in state education, associated political conflict over private 
schooling, and changing social mores (Rae, 1981). During the 1950s and 1960s there 
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had been growing unrest about the UK educational system, primarily surrounding the 
use of selection at age 11 and the continued existence of the private educational 
sector, which was seen as a bastion of the upper classes. In 1964 Harold Wilson 
became Prime Minister as leader of the Labour Party, with commitments from the 
previous year’s party conference to call for an end of the selection system and tackle 
“the problem of public schools”. By 1965 the government had asked Local 
Educational Authorities (LEAs) to draw up plans to convert to a comprehensive 
system, and appointed a commission to review private education. One of the 
recommendations (later accepted) from its second report was the abolition of Direct 
Grant grammar schools, which were partly fee-paying, partly subsidised and 
academically selective. These schools were given the option of joining the 
comprehensive system or becoming fully private, which is what two thirds of them 
did. While the commission did not broaden its attack on the rest of the private school 
system, the political uncertainty remained and in 1973 the Labour Party in opposition 
drew up a long-term strategy for proscribing private education altogether. It was only 
when these plans were abandoned once in power (supported only by a thin majority) 
that the threat to private schools was alleviated. 
The need for political legitimacy in the face of ideological opposition is advanced by 
Rae as one reason why private schools were starting to become more academic over 
this period. Other pressures came from above – a decline in monopoly access to 
Oxford and Cambridge universities, the rise of other universities – and from below in 
the form of growing parent power. At the start of the 1970s private schools saw an 
opportunity in the closing of grammar schools around the country, with groups of 
parents fearing the effect the new comprehensive system would have on their 
children. These parents had only two options: to band together and appeal to their 
Local Education Authority (LEA) to maintain the selective schooling system or to 
send their child to a private school. The former was only moderately successful, with 
19 out of 138 LEAs remaining selective.4 For private schools to take full advantage of 
grammar school closure they needed to attract parents by showing them that they 
provided an educational product worth paying for. All these factors meant that the 
private schools “became more ruthless and single minded in their pursuit of academic 
                                                        
4 It has recently been shown (Manning and Pischke 2006) that these remaining LEAs are not random, 
and selection to undertake the comprehensive system was correlated with the socio economic 
background of its population. 
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success” (Rae, 1981: 155). The balance of the curriculum was shifted away from the 
traditional emphasis on classics towards the sciences (Sanderson, 1999: 102-3). More 
entrance exams were introduced and pass marks were raised. Schools advertised their 
ever-decreasing pupil-teacher ratios, the average A-level grades of their pupils, and 
the number of leavers attending Oxbridge; and they became themselves more 
business-like in their management.  
These internal changes within private schools, along with the changing economic and 
political environment, coincided with a reversal of the schools’ fortunes. The sector, 
parts of which appear to have been in terminal decline during the 1960s and up till the 
mid 1970s, enjoyed a proportionate stabilisation and then a revival from the late 
1970s (see Figure 1 which shows the numbers of full time pupils, schools and 
teachers in the private sector since the mid-1960s).5 
Though the ‘revolution’, as Rae termed it, was said to be over by 1979, this was only 
the start of an era in which parents would be willing to pay continuously-increasing 
real fees for private education (Figure 2). Rising fees could be rationalised if parents 
thought they were getting increased benefits for their money, including rising earnings 
premia. Two broad socio-economic trends lay behind the rising propensity to pay: the 
“knowledge economy”, implying skill-biased technological change (Berman et al., 
1994) with a rapidly-rising demand for qualified labour, and increasing female labour 
force participation. The former meant that high-level qualifications were going to be 
increasingly necessary for economic success, in contrast to previous eras when lower 
qualifications combined with family and school connections were enough. The latter 
meant that girls were increasingly committed to a successful future in the labour 
market, with its academic demands.6 These broad trends applied to all pupils, but the 
greater flexibility of the private sector, not held back by fiscal or political constraints, 
enabled it to offer the required improved academic services. The premium for private 
education would thus be predicted to have increased in this period. One indication of 
the improved services is that the pupil-teacher ratio declined slowly through the 1970s 
and more rapidly since then (Figure 3).7 The drive towards academic achievement 
                                                        
5 See Glennerster (1970: 131-8) for a contemporaneious dissection of the reasons for private sector 
decline. 
6 Even among boys, the increased fees were said to generate a moral commitment to try to ‘do well’ 
(Walford, 1986: 242). 
7 Within the private school sector, there is evidence that lower pupil-teacher ratios lead to superior 
academic performance (Graddy and Stevens, 2003). 
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was also given added emphasis at the margins by the secession of the direct grant 
schools and later by the Conservative government’s Assisted Places Scheme which, 
from 1980 onwards, began to subsidise places in private schools for a small 
proportion of able pupils.8 
The aggregate outcome of these developments has been that the academic 
achievements of private school pupils have been maintained, or even increased, 
relative to those of state-school pupils, despite the continued improvements of the 
latter as the education system expanded in the late 1980s and 1990s. At the top, 
especially, private schools re-asserted and defended their share of places at Oxford 
and Cambridge despite the earlier loss of traditional exclusive routes. The lowest 
points in Oxford and Cambridge acceptances from private schools were encountered 
in 1976 and 1980 respectively (see Figure 4). The early 1980s leap in their Oxbridge 
success rates is partly associated with the addition of the previous, highly academic, 
direct grant schools; but the rate was maintained at a high level, in the range 45% to 
55%, until the present. More broadly, private schools tend on average to score higher 
than state schools on sixth form value-added measures.9 
High aggregate success rates do not, however, prove anything per se about the 
efficacy of private schooling in generating academic achievements or higher pay, if 
only because private school pupils come from well-resourced family backgrounds and 
are often selected on cognitive ability as well as ability to pay. Formal evidence, 
which conditions for these background variables, is necessary.  
There are just a few studies that do this for Britain. For both sexes there is sound 
evidence that private schooling raised overall academic achievements (Dearden et al., 
2002).10 A caveat to this finding, though, is that on average university students who 
had attended a private school were, ceteris paribus, somewhat less likely than similar 
students from state schools to obtain a good degree (Naylor and Smith, 2004; Smith 
and Naylor, 2001, 2005). Dolton and Vignoles (2000) report a premium on wages of 
approximately 7% six years after graduation, using a sample of 1980 graduates. 
Dearden et al. (2002), while investigating school quality, report a 20% wage premium 
                                                        
8 Though means-tested, the scheme’s beneficiaries were often children of professional and managerial 
parents, many of whom had been at private school (Fitz et al., 1989). 
9 National Statistics, Bulletin, Department for Education and Skills, 2004, Issue 01/04, May. 
http://www.dfes.gov.uk/rsgateway/DB/SBU/b000467/index.shtml 
10 Walford (1990: 44-59) provides a review of earlier mainly non-formal studies. 
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(after allowing for highest qualification) at age 33 for employees who had attended 
private school at age 16 in 1974; but found no evidence of an effect at age 23, or for 
females at either age. Covering a later time, Naylor et al. (2002) found an average 
private-school premium of 3% for university students graduating in 1993; they also 
found considerable variation in the premium, which was positively correlated with the 
fees paid. In total, not a great deal is known about the economic impact of private 
schools on their pupils, and there is little evidence about the channels through which 
the impact takes effect or about how the impact and the channels may have changed 
as the schools have been modernised.  
In the light of this historical overview and of the aggregate outcomes a number of 
research questions and hypotheses may be stated: 
1. Assuming parents are spending their money rationally, we expect there to be 
an earnings premium on having received private schooling, enough to cover 
the outlays in fees and ancillary expenses over a number of years, and provide 
a normal return on capital. One caveat is that the return may, in part, be non-
pecuniary. Another is that the benefit might lie in improved marriage or other 
networking prospects outside the domain of employment. Both caveats imply 
that the estimated earnings premium will understate the returns to private 
schooling. 
2. Given the increased fees for private schooling, and in the absence of any 
decline on the return to capital in the 1970s and 1980s, we expect an increase 
over time in the private school premium.  
3. As an extension to Hypothesis 2, it may also be suggested that the trend in 
labour market returns to private schooling may be significantly different 
between males and females. Women may not have benefited greatly in earlier 
periods, due to some girls schools previously performing more like a finishing 
school than a place of educational training. Transformation of girls schools, in 
conjunction with increasing labour market participation of women and the 
rising relative demand for skilled labour, would lead one to expect the returns 
to private schooling to be rising faster for women. 
4. The transformed focus of private schools and the changed economic 
environment lead us to expect academic achievements to have become over 
 9
time a more important channel for the delivery of a return to private school 
attendance.  
 
III.  Data 
To address these questions we utilise the British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) and 
the two British cohort studies (NCDS and BCS) which track people born in 1958 and 
1970. These datasets allow us to examine pupils who were in the educational system 
at the start of the private school reforms and those who were educated later.  
The BHPS is a nationally representative sample of some 5,500 households recruited 
in 1991, with around 10,000 original sample members. These sample members and 
their children, who also become full sample members after reaching 16, are 
interviewed each successive year, together with all adult members of their families, 
even if they split off from their original households to form new families or relocate 
to other areas of the UK. Additionally, new families are added regularly to maintain 
the representativeness of the sample over time. Apart from consistency in 
measurement of key variables over time, BHPS also has the clear advantage of being 
nationally representative which allows us to study the (longer-term) changes in 
returns for different birth cohorts. To study the change in private school premium over 
time, we separate the sample into those who were born before 1960 and those born in 
1960 or later. The first cohort will have gone through education mainly during the 
1950s and 1960s, with a minority before or after, while the latter will have been 
educated largely in the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s.  
The two ongoing mature longitudinal datasets, the National Child Development Study 
(NCDS) and the British Cohort Study (BCS) attempt to follow all individuals living in 
Great Britain who were born in a week of March 1958 (NCDS) and a week of April 
1970 (BCS) respectively. Information is gathered about these cohort members and 
their immediate families at ages 7, 11, 16 and 33 (5, 10, 16 and 30 for BCS). The 
design of these surveys has allowed use of a host of comparable characteristics before 
and after the major educational choices made throughout a child’s life. For the 
dependent variable used in our analysis, we use earnings information obtained at age 
30/33, where employees are asked to provide information on their usual pay, pay 
period and number of hours worked. From this we have derived a figure of gross 
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hourly earnings. Unlike the BHPS there is no possibility of adding new members to 
the study; this has lead to significant attrition and as we shall see the useable number 
of observations is considerable smaller than the 17000 or so in the original samples. 
We have run validation checks to ensure that there have been no significant biases 
introduced in terms of the characteristics identified in the Birth Sweep, which by 
definition is representative.  
One of the main benefits of using the NCDS and BCS is that it allows us to account 
for pre-school treatment characteristics, both cognitive and non-cognitive. The non-
cognitive attributes of the child are observed in the first sweep, where the mother is 
asked to describe the child’s characteristics through a series of 20 questions. We place 
these questions into two categories similar to the Rutter Scales (Blanden et al., 2006) 
for externalising behaviour such as: temper tantrums, hyper-activity, fights often; and 
for internalising behaviour including: sleeping problems, being a solitary child, biting 
of nails and experiencing headaches. This information is then combined into two 
scales using principal component analysis and finally we ensured that the 
relationships between these responses and the behavioural scales were the same 
across cohorts, establishing that we were capturing the same childhood characteristics. 
For the comparative cognitive covariates we drew upon a range of similar tests the 
cohort members undertook, omitting tests that only one of the cohorts experienced. In 
the first sweep standardised scores on vocabulary tests and Harris Figure drawing 
exercises were used. Age 11/10 cognitive skills were derived from standardising 
reading comprehension, and maths scores, as well as word and pattern recognition 
matrices. Although reading based tests were undertaken at age 16, the NCDS used a 
comprehension based test and the BCS used a vocabulary base (this was the same test 
as aged 11 and so there was a lot of clustering near the top of the distribution). In its 
place we used English and Maths exam results taken at age 16, using two scales from 
0-5, with 5 being an A grade or Grade 1, for O-levels and GCEs respectively. 
With these excellent controls for heterogeneity in cognitive and non-cognitive skills 
and for other background variables, the comparison of the NCDS and BCS will 
complement the BHPS estimates of the changing returns over time. The difference in 
the estimated premiums between these two cohorts will be a measure of the different 
roles of private schools for those who were aged 11 in 1969 and 1981; this 
comparison should pick up the hypothesised changes in the private schools described 
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by Rae (1981), but will not capture the effects of increased resources in the private 
schools in the late 1980s and thereafter.11 
 
4.  Empirical Findings 
 
a) Description of Between-Sector Differences Over Time. 
We begin with a description of the older and younger cohorts in each of our data 
sources, categorised by the sector in which employees had been educated. Tables 1A 
and 1B present summary statistics by school type12 for the sample of working men 
and women aged 25 or over but below state retirement age in the first 14 waves of the 
BHPS, and for whom a complete set of information is available on family background 
data. The unit of measurement is the person-year. Tables 1C and 1D compare NCDS 
with BCS by age 11 school type for men and women respectively. Despite the shorter 
time-span (i.e. 12 years compared with an average of 16 years) and the smaller sample 
sizes, the patterns of changes in log wage differential and qualification attainment are 
broadly similar to those for the BHPS.  
The tables show that there existed a raw private school wage premium both for older 
and younger cohorts. For example, female ex-pupils of private schools in our BCS 
sample earned 32.9% more than ex-pupils of state schools. The premium is 
substantially greater for men than for women in every cohort; and the premium is 
greater in the later than in the earlier cohort according to both data sources for 
women, and according to the BHPS for men. Unsurprisingly, ex-pupils of private 
schools come predominantly from upper class families: in the BCS, for example, 
67.4% had fathers in Socioeconomic Groups I and II (Managerial, Technical and 
Professional Occupations), as compared with 21.7% of ex-State-school pupils. 
Of special interest are the between-sector differences in educational attainment and 
how these change over time. In both state and private sectors there are increases in 
                                                        
11 Note, however, that inferences about cohort differences will be premised on the identifying 
assumption that labour market changes between 1991 and 2004 for the BHPS and between 1991 and 
2000 for the NCDS/BCS are not themselves the source of change in the independent school premium. 
12 School type in the BHPS refers to the type of school last attended. Since the compulsory school 
leaving age in the UK was 15 for people born between 1933 and 1957 and 16 for later birth cohorts, it 
is not straightforward to compare the BHPS results to those for the two cohort studies, which measure 
school type at the age of 11 (school type at age 16 contains too many missing values due to the teacher 
strike). However, there appears to be relatively little changing of school types between the age of 11 
and 16 in the NCDS. 
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educational achievements between the earlier and later cohorts, according to both the 
BHPS and the NCDS/BCS pair. As gauged by the average years of education, private 
schools widened their lead over their state counterparts, according to the NCDS/BCS 
pair. This change over time is consistent with the story told in Section 2: during the 
1970s and 1980s the private schools were ahead of the state sector in putting more 
emphasis on academic achievements than they had chosen to earlier. The largest 
improvement in the private sector was at degree level and above, while in the state 
sector sample the big improvement was at the other end of the spectrum. Thus, in the 
private sector, the proportions with first or higher degrees rose from 38.6% to 54.0% 
(males) or 39.2% to 62.6% (females); these compare with a growth from 14.4% to 
20.3% (males) or 10.5% to 18.4% (females) in the state sector. By contrast, the 
proportions with no qualifications at all fell from 5.2% to 2.4% (males) and 10.5% to 
0% (females) in the private sector, as against 23.9% to 11.9% (males) and 31.1% to 
11.1% (females) in the state sector.  
It is to be expected that a good part of the raw pay differential between private and 
state school ex-pupils is attributable to family background and other variables. We are 
particularly interested in the extent to which the differential is explicable in terms of 
the differences in educational achievement. We now proceed therefore to derive 
formal conditional estimates of the premium for private education, using a range of 
techniques. The prime method for calculating the premium will be through estimating 
the coefficient attached to private school participation in conventional earnings 
functions, relating the individual’s log real hourly earnings to education, work 
experience and other controls to be discussed below.  
In Section 4.1 we present a range of least squares estimates. As always the possibility 
of endogenous school type needs to be considered. More able children, it might be 
argued, could benefit more from private education and may be selected by the 
schools. If so, and if ability goes unobserved by the researcher the estimated treatment 
effect of private schooling will be upward biased. On the other hand, some parents 
may choose private schooling for their less able children in order to compensate for 
perceived difficulties in the state system – thus introducing a potential downward 
bias. Bias might also derive from failure to take account of family influences on both 
school choice and subsequent earning power. The best defence against these potential 
sources of bias is to include a rich array of measures of ability and of social 
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background, which we are able to do with our chosen data. Alternatively, one could 
instrument school type; however, there are no available variables that could be argued 
to affect school type but not earnings.  
In Section 4.2 we also apply the method of propensity score matching (PSM). The 
idea behind PSM is to match private school leavers with “similar” state-school leavers 
using control variables for family background as well as cognitive and non-cognitive 
characteristics where available.  
While least squares estimates are concerned with the effect at the mean, policy makers 
and prospective consumers of private education might also be interested in returns at 
other parts of the distribution, given the heterogeneity in student ability, family 
background and school quality. Therefore in Section 4.3 we present quantile 
regressions at various percentiles of the earnings distribution. 
   
4.1 Least Squares Estimates 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) estimates are presented in Tables 2A to 2D. The 
top left cell of each table gives a baseline figure for the private-school premium, 
absent any controls. As can be seen, the estimates of the raw differential range from 
0.127 (or 14% for women in the Pre-1960 BHPS cohorts in Table 2A) to 0.311 (or 
36% for men in the BCS cohort in Table 2D).13 
In each table successive rows give the private school coefficient estimate after 
introducing further sets of covariates covering pre-existing variables that may directly 
affect earnings in later life. Successive columns then introduce covariates that may 
directly affect earnings but which post-date, and are therefore affected by, the choice 
of school type.14 In this manner, the tables give a picture of the extent to which the 
premium is accounted for by the post-school-choice covariates (primarily, the 
qualifications achieved). 
Consider first the earlier cohorts. For the Pre-1960 cohorts in the BHPS, Table 2A 
shows that family background explains a large proportion of the raw premium, 
accounting for a third of the returns for men and over half for women. A similar 
                                                        
13 In each case we report the effect on log pay, with the associated percentage premium in brackets. 
14  Note that the BHPS cohorts Tables also include a column controlling for age, which obviously is not 
necessary in the case of the NCDS and BCS cohorts who are (in their respective cohorts) aged the 
same. 
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pattern is reported in Table 2C from the NCDS 1958 birth cohort. In Table 2C, once 
prior cognitive and non-cognitive skills are further controlled for, one could not reject 
the null hypothesis that on average attendance at a private school in this earlier era 
generated no private pecuniary benefits in later life. This finding appears striking but 
one should not necessarily conclude that the private school investment was wasted. 
There may have been consumer or non-pay benefits not captured in our approach. 
Moreover, the point estimates of the premia remain positive. Schools and pupils are 
also quite heterogeneous, leaving the possibility that some groups did benefit, a 
question to which we return below.  
The picture changes with the later cohorts. In these cases the extent to which family 
background and prior abilities account for the private school premium is reduced, and 
there remains a premium whatever one’s background, estimated for males to be 0.158 
(17%) for the BHPS and 0.173 (19%) for the BCS, and for females to be 0.173 (19%) 
for the BHPS and 0.149 (16%) for the BCS. 
To sum up so far, in respect of hypothesis 1 the premium was substantial in the later 
cohorts but not in the earlier cohorts. In respect of hypothesis 2 and 3, the premium 
for males increased by about 10 percentage points in the case of the NCDS/BCS pair, 
but by only 4 points (and insignificantly) in the BHPS. Thus for males the expectation 
that the return would have increased over the period is only partially supported. For 
females, however, the increase in the premium is more substantial, from 6% to 19%. 
With a similar pattern in the NCDS/BCS, these findings support hypothesis 3: over 
this time girls schools came to deliver an educational product that was more valued in 
the labour market than in earlier cohorts. 
Reading further across the columns of Tables 2B and 2D it can be seen that the 
private school premium observed in later cohorts is very largely accounted for by the 
skills and qualifications gained at school. Taking the BCS findings for females, for 
example, the return is reduced from 0.149 (16%) to 0.045 (5%) after controlling for 
cognitive skills, and to 0.011 (1%) after controlling also for the maximum achieved 
educational qualification. In all cases the coefficient estimate, after controlling for 
maximum qualifications, is insignificantly different from zero. Thus one could not 
reject the hypothesis that on average there are no network benefits or other benefits 
associated with non-certified human capital from private schooling. The significant 
benefits are exclusively associated with the academic qualifications (and in the case of 
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BCS the cognitive skills) attributable to private schooling. Since there were no 
significant benefits in the earlier cohorts, this finding is consistent with hypothesis 4, 
confirming that Rae (1981) was correct to stress the academic transformation of 
private schools in the 1970s. 
4.2 Robustness check: Propensity Score Matching estimates. 
A possible concern with the analysis above is that private and state school attendees 
are quite different in their observable characteristics so that linear unweighted 
regression methods may suffer from a lack of common support. This problem can be 
accounted for using Propensity Score Matching (PSM) as one can restrict the analysis 
to those individuals from the state sector who share similar enough characteristics to 
have possibly attended a private school and vice versa. PSM also has the advantage of 
being in effect a fully interacted OLS model, allowing for each control variable to 
have an effect on each other. Finally, its semi-parametric nature does not require us to 
make the assumption of linearity in the outcome equation.  
As a means of testing the robustness of the findings to date Appendix Tables A to D 
therefore present PSM estimates of the returns to private education for both sets of 
cohorts. Here the treatment group (private-school attendees) and the control group 
(state-school attendees) are matched on all pre school characteristics.15 The first row 
reports the raw (prematched) differences. 
Unlike with the OLS findings, PSM gives a statistically significant premium for males 
in the earlier cohort of the BHPS. However, the premium for females is low and 
insignificant. Concerning Hypothesis 2, as we saw with the OLS analysis we find an 
increase in the returns for attending a private school. The Average Treatment effect on 
the Treated (ATT) for males rose from 12% to 19% in the BHPS and a similar 8% to 
18% in the cohort studies. Similarly the Average Treatment effect on the Untreated 
(ATU) (the effect private schooling would have had on those who attended at state 
sector school) also increased over this period. The ATT, but not the ATU, rose more 
for females than for males. Although few of the matching estimates from the 
NCDS/BCS pair are statistically significant, they show a pattern that is consistent 
with the BHPS results in general. Also worthy of note is that in both BHPS cohorts 
the estimated ATU exceeds the ATT, implying that there were some state-school girls 
                                                        
15 For PSM we are not controlling for highest qualification achieved as this is a post treatment 
observation and would lead to misleading results. 
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who would have benefited more from attending private schools than those who 
actually attended. The same is true of the younger, but not the older, male cohorts. 
4.3 Quantile Regression 
The Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression focuses exclusively on the conditional 
mean function and hence gives a rather incomplete summary of the joint distribution 
of the dependent and explanatory variables. In contrast, the Quantile Regression 
method provides a richer characterization of the data through the estimation of a range 
of conditional quantile functions (the most well-known of which is the conditional 
median function) and can be consistent under weaker stochastic assumptions than 
with least squares estimation.  
In Tables 3A to 3D we use Quantile Regressions to investigate heterogeneity in the 
private school premium and how this has changed over time. The models presented 
correspond to the bottom row specifications in Tables 2A to 2D which control for 
family backgrounds. The tables show that the OLS estimates of the premium average 
out a considerable heterogeneity across the quantiles. For example, with the BHPS 
sample the premium for males is 0.168 (18%) at the 90th percentile and - 0.009 (-1%) 
at the 10th percentile. 
For males, returns are generally bigger at the higher quantiles (though the relationship 
is not monotonic). If we assume that the residuals in the pay equations capture a 
combination of unobserved attributes and abilities, this finding means that private 
schools have more of an impact on pay the greater is the unobserved individual 
ability. This finding is consistent with the expectation that the private schools 
attended by more able pupils are of better quality (in this sense, that they deliver a 
higher pay premium). In other words, the better schools may be more academically 
selective. For females a similar pattern is found using the BHPS. Thus, unlike with 
the OLS estimates, where the finding was that private schools had no significant 
average effect in the earlier cohorts, it is seen here that the upper quantiles did receive 
a significant premium. Only in the lower quantiles were there no wage benefits.  
In several cases the estimated premium increased over time, especially for females, 
consistent with the OLS findings. For males there were rises at the 10th and 25th 
percentiles, implying improvements in the return from schools attended by lower 
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ability pupils, but no rises for the upper quantiles. For females, there were rises at 
both the upper and the lower quantiles.  
After controlling for maximum achieved qualification the estimated premia are much 
reduced but a similar pattern is found. For example, in the older BHPS cohort, the 
returns for males are significant and positive at all the percentiles shown, other than 
the 10th percentile where the premium is negative. The implication is that private 
schools, in all but the lowest ability students, were delivering something over and 
above academic qualifications that was of value in the labour market. This finding is 
consistent with there being an ‘old boys’ network’ for some schools, or else with the 
schools inculcating valuable uncertified qualities in their pupils. The data could not 
discriminate between these alternative explanations. There remains, however, no 
evidence in the older cohorts of significant positive premia for females at any quartile, 




Despite its relatively small size, the private school sector plays a prominent role in 
British society. A good understanding of the magnitude and source of the private 
school premium and any trends over time is important from a public policy 
perspective. However, for various reasons this subject has been under-researched. 
This paper has aimed to start to fill this gap by focusing on the changing returns to 
private education in Britain using data from the NCDS and BCS birth cohorts along 
with the British Household Panel Survey. We have presented consistent evidence that 
the returns to private schooling increased significantly for the more recent birth 
cohorts, and more sharply for women than for men.  There is also evidence of 
differential changes at different points of the distribution, as evidenced by the quantile 
regression estimates. 
In light of the development of education policy, and of changes in the economic and 
social environment, private schools began a process of transformation in the late 
1960s and thereafter. We expected therefore that, whereas those attending private 
school before the transformation took full effect will have received some pay benefits 
in return for the investment, those attending in later years (and paying higher fees) 
would have received an increased return (especially females). We also expected that 
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the achievement of academic qualifications was becoming the channel through which 
most returns were delivered. 
To examine these expectations we split the BHPS sample into older and younger 
cohorts, and in a complementary analysis compared estimates between the NCDS and 
BCS cohorts which are 12 years apart in age. Between earlier and later cohorts the 
private schools considerably widened their academic lead over state schools as 
measured by the subsequent achievement of university degrees. Our hypotheses are 
generally supported by the findings which have emerged in a robust way using a 
range of estimation techniques. In the later cohorts our least squares estimates of the 
pay premium, after allowing for family background and other controls, were in the 
range 16% to 19%. The findings were refined using quantile regressions, which 
showed that the returns from private schools were larger for those with greater 
‘residual’ or unobserved earning abilities, consistent with the observation that high 
quality schools are academically selective. In the OLS results we found no evidence 
of any significant private school premium once family background was controlled for; 
however, the quantile regressions revealed that it was only at the lower quantiles that 
there was no significant positive premium. Similarly, in the OLS results that control 
for qualifications achieved there was no evidence that could support the existence of 
an ‘old boys’ network’ in the earlier cohorts. Yet, the quantile regressions revealed 
that there were significant positive returns for males at all but the lowest (10th) 
percentile; and these could be seen as evidence for additional effects of private 
schooling which may include network effects. 
To obtain these benefits, pupils’ families had to pay fees. Did they get good value? 
While it is impossible to provide a definitive answer to this question with available 
data, one can deduce an order-of magnitude estimate for the average net return. 
Taking the private-school-educated respondents in the BCS cohort, the average 
annual boarding fee was £2700 at 1980 prices, which with an assumed 10-year 
private-school period, and allowing for alternative cost reductions, equates roughly to 
£75,000 at 2000 prices. At this point in their lives our estimate (a 19% premium) 
implies an additional £5,000 extra pay received in 2000. While this premium might 
alter over time it would extend into pension receipts. Using this figure as a rough 
estimate of annual returns over the course of a post-school lifetime gives a return on 
capital of approximately 7%. 
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The estimates of the net return and the premium, however, are also subject to a few 
caveats. Perhaps most importantly, the transformation of private schools changed 
considerably the experience of children at private schools. Vastly improved facilities 
for diverse sporting and cultural activities raised the quality of the experience over 
previous eras. These benefits, widely known to exceed those available in state 
schools, net out part of the cost of private school investments. The estimated average 
net rate of return, 7%, is thus an underestimate. For those groups of private-school 
pupils who were at the lower quantiles of the residual pay distribution and who appear 
to have received no financial premium, their consolation might have to be sought 
here.  
One reason why the premium might be underestimated arises from measurement 
error. Since sectoral allocation in our sample is based on school attendance at one age 
(11), the data do not capture the effect of individuals switching between sectors. 
Measurement error in an independent variable would generate downward bias in the 
absolute size of the coefficient estimate. Set against these downward biases, there 
remains also the possibility of omitted variable bias, previously alluded to, which 
could generate biases in either direction depending on the selection policies of schools 
and the strategies of parents. We have suggested, however, that the rich and unique 
NCDS/BCS survey pair include several aspects of ability and social background much 
more effectively than in most studies of earnings.  
The implications of these findings are as follows. On average those paying for private 
education in the 1970s and beyond were getting good value for their money. Above 
the fact that private school pupils were spending their school lives enjoying facilities 
normally far better than those available in state schools, these pupils benefited 
through improved pay later in life, and the financial return is broadly comparable to 
the returns on other capital. Around the average the benefits were greater for some 
than for others, but so also did the fees vary. It is also apparent that the chief means of 
delivering the labour market return is through the better academic qualifications that 
are delivered by private schools using their rising resources. If academic 
achievements are, therefore, to be a target for government policy, emulation of the 
private schools would appear to be a policy worth considering. Nevertheless the 
exclusiveness of the private schools is also shown in the fact that the sector has not 
expanded beyond its roughly 8% of the total pupil base for many decades. Our 
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findings also imply that many others could have benefited from the boost given by the 
resources available in private schooling, but did not do so. Since selection into the 
schools, despite some bursaries and the Assisted Places Scheme, is primarily based on 
families’ ability to pay, and given the substantial returns achieved, it is hard to escape 
the conclusion that private schools during the period under examination also served to 
reproduce inequalities in British society.16 
Neither the NCDS/BCS comparison nor the BHPS split will have captured the effect 
of the inflation-busting rises in school fees of the recent decade. Therefore, the 
changes we have examined in this paper only cover the start of a period of long-term 
transformation of the private school sector fuelled by rising resources. There is an 
ongoing research need here, to examine whether very recent private school graduands 
are getting still larger premiums to match the rising fees. We think that research into 
these private returns should also be part of a broader plan for better understanding of 
the role of private schools in Britain, including their external effects on other schools 
and within the labour market, with concomitant implications for both education and 
taxation policies. 
                                                        
16 See Walford (1991: 103-121) for a balanced consideration of arguments for and against private 
schools in the light of contemporaneous evidence. 
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Notes: Source-DSCF 2007; i) Full Time Pupils Only; ii) State Sector Includes; Primary, Secondary, 
Nursery & Special Schools; iii) Includes both the full-time and the full-time equivalent of part-time 
teachers; iv) From 1971 onwards, state sector only includes qualified teachers; v) Independent Sector 
includes Direct Grant Grammar Schools up to and including 1980; vi) From 1990 Independent Sector 
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1971 onwards, state sector only includes qualified teachers; v) Private Sector includes Direct Grant 
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Table 1A: Summary Statistics: BHPS Male (cross-sectional weights used) 









Log real wage (dep. var) 2.390 2.419 2.159 2.174 
Age 48.91 32.68 48.29 32.42 
South-east region 0.493 0.427 0.333 0.302 
Prop. married  0.807 0.557 0.798 0.527 
Prop. Cohabiting 0.056 0.174 0.058 0.174 
Self-employed  0.236 0.146 0.193 0.125 
Prop. with higher degrees 0.124 0.047 0.035 0.032 
Prop. with first degrees 0.262 0.493 0.109 0.171 
Prop. with further edu. qual. 0.394 0.196 0.326 0.350 
Prop. with A Levels 0.110 0.144 0.124 0.131 
Prop. with O Levels 0.058 0.094 0.164 0.183 
Prop. with no qualifications 0.052 0.024 0.239 0.119 
Prop. with missing qualifications 0.000 0.002 0.004 0.014 
Years of education 15.24 15.95 12.83 13.81 
Father has some qualification 0.324 0.170 0.135 0.266 
Father has further educ. 
qualification 
0.272 0.358 0.201 0.317 
Father has degree 0.148 0.338 0.035 0.085 
Family non-intact when respondent 
16 
0.915 0.825 0.889 0.833 
Number of siblings 1.729 1.533 2.224 1.919 
Mother’s age when respondent 
born 
29.26 27.94 27.89 26.78 
Birth order index 0.935 0.934 0.969 0.998 
Unweighted Number of 
Observations (person-year) 




Table 1B: Summary Statistics: BHPS Female (cross-sectional weights used) 









Log real wage (dep. var) 1.983 2.208 1.894 2.004 
Age 48.55 31.17 47.38 32.52 
South-east region 0.564 0.556 0.330 0.296 
Prop. married  0.739 0.603 0.748 0.573 
Prop. Cohabiting 0.048 0.128 0.051 0.175 
Self-employed  0.174 0.146 0.067 0.045 
Prop. with higher degrees 0.098 0.039 0.025 0.028 
Prop. with first degrees 0.294 0.587 0.080 0.156 
Prop. with further edu. qual. 0.207 0.159 0.270 0.360 
Prop. with A Levels 0.088 0.154 0.077 0.121 
Prop. with O Levels 0.208 0.060 0.232 0.219 
Prop. with no qualifications 0.105 0.000 0.311 0.111 
Prop. with missing qualifications 0.001 0.001 0.005 0.005 
Years of education 15.03 16.34 12.89 13.99 
Father has some qualification 0.221 0.204 0.104 0.205 
Father has further educ. 
qualification 
0.282 0.328 0.261 0.338 
Father has degree 0.214 0.416 0.046 0.075 
Family non-intact when respondent 
16 
0.900 0.950 0.890 0.843 
Number of siblings 1.747 1.588 2.308 1.928 
Mother’s age when respondent 
born 
30.065 30.222 28.39 27.19 
Birth order index 0.977 1.132 0.965 1.026 
Unweighted Number of 
Observations (person-year) 
1045 499 13033 12293 
Notes: sample with non-missing family background information and wages. 
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Table 1C: Summary Statistics: NCDS & BCS Male 
  Private Age 11 State Age 11 
  NCDS BCS NCDS BCS 
Log Real Gross Hourly Wage 2.537 2.533 2.302 2.227 
Log Real Gross Weekly Wage 6.301 6.415 6.043 6.049 
Father Figures:     
Social Economic Group I 0.198 0.283 0.050 0.056 
Social Economic Group II 0.431 0.391 0.136 0.161 
Social Economic Group III Non Manual 0.043 0.087 0.096 0.085 
Social Economic Group III Manual 0.095 0.011 0.412 0.389 
Social Economic Group IV 0.060 0.000 0.154 0.097 
Social Economic Group V 0.000 0.000 0.040 0.027 
Social Economic Group NA 0.009 0.011 0.022 0.031 
Social Economic Group Miss 0.164 0.217 0.090 0.154 
      
Birth Index 1.033 1.088 0.974 1.055 
Ethinc Minority 0.026 0.022 0.018 0.020 
Natural Mother 0.802 0.772 0.899 0.848 
Natural Father 0.802 0.761 0.867 0.806 
Non UK Mother 0.095 0.087 0.050 0.056 
Non UK father 0.060 0.076 0.062 0.064 
South East 0.259 0.207 0.179 0.146 
Post Degree 0.017 0.141 0.022 0.041 
Degree 0.431 0.500 0.145 0.140 
A level  0.181 0.152 0.083 0.087 
O level 0.259 0.152 0.400 0.428 
Below O level 0.078 0.033 0.209 0.112 
Average Highest Qualification 3.054 3.578 2.266 2.468 
Years of education 15.577 17.174 12.762 12.923 
Total 116 92 2680 3140 
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Table 1D: Summary Statistics: NCDS & BCS Female 
  Private Age 11 State Age 11 
  NCDS BCS NCDS BCS 
Log Real Gross Hourly Wage 2.217 2.333 1.968 2.056 
Log Real Gross Weekly Wage 5.429 6.019 5.170 5.501 
 Father Figures:     
Social Economic Group I 0.260 0.226 0.043 0.060 
Social Economic Group II 0.365 0.369 0.135 0.178 
Social Economic Group III Non Manual 0.021 0.048 0.098 0.074 
Social Economic Group III Manual 0.125 0.083 0.423 0.371 
Social Economic Group IV 0.063 0.012 0.136 0.101 
Social Economic Group V 0.000 0.000 0.051 0.029 
Social Economic Group NA 0.000 0.036 0.025 0.037 
Social Economic Group Miss 0.167 0.226 0.089 0.151 
      
Birth Index 1.007 1.104 0.987 1.047 
Ethinc Minority 0.010 0.000 0.015 0.025 
Natural Mother 0.802 0.774 0.900 0.848 
Natural Father 0.792 0.738 0.861 0.795 
Non UK Mother 0.063 0.048 0.057 0.069 
Non UK father 0.052 0.060 0.053 0.070 
South East 0.281 0.310 0.169 0.160 
Post Degree 0.083 0.155 0.023 0.051 
Degree 0.292 0.476 0.136 0.151 
A level  0.167 0.155 0.097 0.105 
O level 0.375 0.190 0.457 0.489 
Below O level 0.031 0.012 0.167 0.105 
Average Highest Qualification 3.022 3.578 2.307 2.506 
Years of education 14.525 16.667 12.785 13.295 




Table 2A: BHPS Returns Matrix, Pre-1960 Birth cohorts 
Male 
N=15011 
No controls Plus age, age sq, South 
East 
(Baseline Model) 




















No controls Plus age, age sq, South 
East 
(Baseline Model) 


















Table 2B: BHPS Returns Matrix, Post-1960 Birth cohorts  
Male 
N=11928 
No controls Plus age, age sq, South 
East 
(Baseline Model) 




















No controls Plus age, age sq, South 
East 
(Baseline Model) 


















*** indicates statistical significance at the 1%, ** for 5% and * for 10% level. Standard errors in parentheses. 
Max qualification: Dummies for higher degree, first degree, further education, A Level, O Level, and missing 
qualifications (omitted category: qualification below O Level) 
Family background variables: dummies for father having degree, further education qualification, some qualification 
(omitted cat: no qualification) an indicator for living in non-intact families when the respondent was 16, number of 
siblings, mother’s age when respondent was born and birth order index (see Booth & Kee 2005, IZA DP 1713). 
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Table 2C: NCDS Returns Matrix, Age 11, Wages 33 
NCDS Males, Private School Age 11, Wages 33.  (N=2796) 
 
 
 No Controls 
Plus: Age 10/11 
Cognitive 




0.249*** 0.147*** 0.115** 0.078* 
Private School 0.047 0.045 0.045 0.045 
0.090* 0.07 0.058 0.039 Plus: Family 
Background 0.049 0.047 0.047 0.047 
0.085* 0.073 0.062 0.042 
Plus: Age 5/7 Cognitive 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.047 
0.086* 0.073 0.062 0.042 Plus: Age 5/7 Non 
Cognitive 0.048 0.047 0.047 0.047 
  
NCDS Females, Private School Age 11, Wages 33.  (N=2176) 
 No Controls 
Plus: Age 10/11 
Cognitive 




0.277*** 0.115** 0.089* 0.067 
Private School 0.056 0.052 0.052 0.05 
0.096* 0.032 0.028 0.04 Plus: Family 
Background 0.057 0.054 0.054 0.053 
0.084 0.035 0.03 0.043 
Plus: Age 5/7 Cognitive 0.056 0.054 0.054 0.053 
0.084 0.035 0.03 0.042 Plus: Age 5/7 Non 
Cognitive 0.056 0.055 0.054 0.053 
 Note: *** indicates statistical significance at the 1%, ** for 5% and * for 10%. 
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Table 2D: BCS Returns Matrix, Age 11, Wages 30 
BCS Males, Private School Age 11, Wages 30. (N=3232) 
 No Controls 
Plus: Age 10/11 
Cognitive 




0.307*** 0.194*** 0.158*** 0.082 
Private School 0.057 0.056 0.055 0.055 
0.159*** 0.126** 0.115** 0.063 Plus: Family 
Background 0.058 0.056 0.056 0.056 
0.164*** 0.131** 0.120** 0.068 
Plus: Age 5/7 Cognitive 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.056 
0.168*** 0.135** 0.123** 0.07 Plus: Age 5 Non 
Cognitive 0.057 0.056 0.056 0.056 
  
BCS Females, Private School Age 11, Wages 30. (N=2846) 
 No Controls 
Plus: Age 10/11 
Cognitive 




0.288*** 0.115** 0.085 0.032 
Private School 0.057 0.055 0.054 0.053 
0.149*** 0.054 0.038 0.005 Plus: Family 
Background 0.057 0.055 0.055 0.054 
0.143** 0.056 0.039 0.006 
Plus: Age 5/7 Cognitive 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.054 
0.144** 0.056 0.04 0.006 Plus: Age 5 Non 
Cognitive 0.056 0.055 0.055 0.054 




Table 3A: BHPS Quantile regression, Pre-1960 Birth cohorts 
 
 
 Male Female 
 Not controlling for 
max qualifications 
Controlling for Max 
Qualification 
Not controlling for 
max qualifications 
Controlling for Max 
Qualification 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
10th 
percentile 






0.064* 0.035 0.051** 0.022 -0.009 0.038 0.007 0.018 
50th 
percentile 
0.134** 0.052 0.043** 0.018 0.156**
* 














0.027 0.103 0.088 0.011 0.022 
Obs  15011  14078 
OLS 0.116 0.076 0.021 0.074 0.051 0.068 -0.040 0.063 
 
 
Table 3B: BHPS Quantile regression, Post-1960 Birth cohorts 
 
 Male Female 
 Not controlling for 
max qualifications 
Controlling for Max 
Qualification 
Not controlling for 
max qualifications 
Controlling for Max 
Qualification 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
10th 
percentile 
0.080* 0.042 0.006 0.042 0.141**
* 





0.026 0.017 0.023 0.142**
* 





0.022 0.034 0.019 0.155**
* 























Obs 11928 11928 12792 12792 
OLS 0.130** 0.059 0.033 0.058 0.143 0.094 0.004 0.086 
 
Notes: All models control for age, age square, the South-east region, and family background variables, apart from a 
private school dummy. Family background variables include dummies for father having degree, further education 
qualification, some qualification (omitted cat: no qualification) an indicator for living in non-intact families when the 
respondent was 16,  mother’s age when respondent was born and birth order index (see Booth & Kee 2005, IZA DP 
1713).  
 
[TABLES 3C AND 3D TO BE ADDED] 
Table 3C: NCDS Quantile regression, Age 11, Wages 33 
 Male Female 
 Not controlling for 
max qualifications 
Controlling for Max 
Qualification 
Not controlling for 
max qualifications 
Controlling for Max 
Qualification 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
10th 
percentile 0.021 0.07 0.024 0.085 
0.205**
* 0.054 0.037 0.058 
25th 
percentile 0.051 0.052 -0.021 0.059 0.034 0.053 0.06 0.052 
50th 
percentile 0.135** 0.059 0.094* 0.057 
0.195**






* 0.051 0.143** 0.062 0.036 0.064 
90th 
percentile 0.147* 0.077 0.099* 0.051 0.114 0.098 0.119 0.097 
Obs 2796 2796 2176 2176 
OLS 0.090* 0.049 0.039 0.047 0.096* 0.057 0.04 0.053 
 
 34
Table 3D: BCS Quantile regression, Age 11, Wages 30 
 Male Female 
 Not controlling for 
max qualifications 
Controlling for Max 
Qualification 
Not controlling for 
max qualifications 
Controlling for Max 
Qualification 
 Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. Coeff S.E. 
10th 
percentile 0.009 0.109 -0.03 0.094 0.160** 0.07 -0.013 0.067 
25th 
















* 0.07 0.124 0.087 0.022 0.100 
Obs 3232 3232 2847 2847 
OLS 0.159**
* 0.058 0.063 0.056 
0.149**
* 0.057 0.005 0.054 
 




Appendix Table A: Propensity Score Matching (PSM), BHPS Pre-1960 Birth cohorts 
 Men Women 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Prematched 0.158*** 0.030 0.148*** 0.025 
ATT 0.121** 0.050 0.034 0.041 
ATU -0.102 0.085 0.087** 0.041 
ATE -0.088 0.080 0.083** 0.039 
 
Appendix Table B: Propensity Score Matching (PSM), BHPS Post-1960 Birth cohorts 
 Men Women 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Prematched 0.285*** 0.032 0.238*** 0.033 
ATT 0.198*** 0.046 0.159*** 0.052 
ATU 0.323*** 0.045 0.274*** 0.066 
ATE 0.315*** 0.043 0.270*** 0.064 
 
Appendix Table C: Propensity Score Matching (PSM), NCDS Age 11, Wages 33 
 Men Women 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Prematched 
0.237*** 0.049 0.154*** 0.055 
ATT 
0.084 0.066 -0.015 0.080 
ATU 
0.009 0.059 0.088 0.112 
ATE 
0.005 0.062 0.093 0.117 
 
Appendix Table D: Propensity Score Matching (PSM), BCS Age 11, Wages 30 
 Men Women 
 Coefficient Std. Error Coefficient Std. Error 
Prematched 
0.299*** 0.060 0.283*** 0.061 
ATT 
0.182* 0.093 0.064 0.112 
ATU 
0.101 0.132 0.114 0.073 
ATE 
0.095 0.137 0.117 0.076 
Notes: 5-nearest neighbours matching enforcing common support, using the STATA routine psmatch2 (Leuven and 
Sianesi 2003). Standard errors bootstrapped with 200 repetitions. *** indicates statistical significance at the 1%, ** for 
5% and * for 10%. 
